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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan has a history of taxing agriculture through the land revenue system. 
Being income and price inelastic, the replacement of the system with agricultural income 
tax is considered inevitable for meeting the financial needs of a growing national 
economy. In fact, under pressures from World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Pakistan introduced various variants of agricultural income tax in the past and in 
full during 1993 and 1996 respectively [World Bank (1999)]. However the introduction 
of agricultural income tax is a highly controversial issue in Pakistan,  in  government 
circles as well as among  professional researchers and economists.  Out of the nine 
commissions [Pakistan (1959, 1960, 1963, 1964, 1970, 1975, 1986, 1988, 1989 and 
1993a)] that studied agricultural taxation only two recommended it.  [Pakistan (1960, 
1993a)]. The remaining seven favoured the existing land revenue system. The studies of 
individual economists are no less controversial in this respect. There seems to be a 
general consensus among such writers as [Hamid (1970); Yaqub (1971); Chowdhury 
(1971); Khan (1991) and World Bank (1999)] on the repeal of land revenue system in 
favour of agricultural income or graduated land tax. Against this an equal number of 
economists, have shown dissatisfaction with agricultural income tax as an effective tool 
of taxing agriculture [Ahmad and Stern (1989); Bird (1974); Bird and Oldman (1990); 
Chaudhry and Maan (1993); Gold and Foster (1972) and Newbery (1987)]. 
While the merits and demerits of agricultural income tax perceived by various 
writers in theory and practice are a major source of the controversy, the present paper 
attempts to provide an assessment of introducing the policy in Pakistan in the light of 
typical characteristics of a good tax policy if only to recommend viable alternatives. 
 
 
M. Ghaffar Chaudhry is Joint Director at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 
Islamabad. 
Author’s Note: Author bears full responsibility for the ideas expressed in this paper. M. Ghaffar Chaudhry  758 
In line with these objectives, the paper’s outline consists of five sections. 
Following the current introductory section, the benefits of agricultural income 
tax in terms of revenue generation, resource-use efficiency and as a fair and just 
system of taxation are spelled out in Section 2. Some of its limitations as an 
effective policy tool under Pakistan’s conditions are discussed in Section 3. In 
Section 4, policy recommendations are made. The final Section 5 contains 
concluding remarks. 
 
2.  MERITS OF AGRICULTURAL INCOME TAX 
The theoretical desirability of agricultural income tax follows from a number 
of considerations. 
The case for agricultural income tax follows from low contributions of 
agriculture to government’s tax revenue. It is argued that, although agriculture’s 
share in national income exceeds 23 percent, revenue raised from the sector is, at 
best, minuscule [World Bank (1999)]. With limited tax potential of many 
subsistence farmers, the land revenue system needs to be replaced by agricultural 
income tax for any significant increase in revenues from this sector. It is further 
argued that since the discrimination against agriculture in the form of low prices has 
ended or diminished in recent years, there exists a  large untaxed potential which can 
be tapped by taxing this sector  [Khan (1991) and World Bank (1999)].  
The justification for agricultural income tax is further built on criticism of 
land revenue system as an outmoded, regressive and price and income inelastic 
system of taxation. By contrast the progressive rate structure of agricultural income 
tax permits heavier taxation of those with sufficient ability to pay and exemptions 
for the poor. Thus the system of agricultural income tax is helpful in achieving the 
most cherished goals of economic development such as equitable income 
distribution, poverty alleviation and resultant better nutrition in the rural areas. It has 
also been argued that the income-based tax system would be income and price 
elastic and would rid the economy of costly and politically sensitive periodic land 
assessments for increases in government’s tax revenue from agriculture [Chowdhury 
(1971); Hamid (1970); Khan (1991) and World Bank (1999)]. 
The large and prosperous farmers are typically characterised by under-
utilisation and inefficient use of land resources. The cultivation intensity of land 
varies inversely with farm size and equals 150 percent on farms under 5.0 acres but 
is only 70 percent for farms exceeding 150 acres [Pakistan (1993)]. Therefore  rising 
and higher tax rates under income tax should force many large farms to use their 
land more intensively and efficiently. 
The desirability of agricultural income tax also follows from the benefit 
approach as large farmers have been argued to benefit more from government’s 
policies of input subsidies, institutional credit and extension and research services. The Theory and Practice of Agricultural Income Tax 
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The introduction of agricultural income tax may prove to be cost effective as  
tax assessment and collection may be undertaken by income tax department and the 
services of provincial revenue departments may no longer be needed after repeal of 
land revenue system. 
Finally, the higher tax rates for the well-to-do  may restrict mass consumption 
by the rich and the policy may ensure stability of  prices of most of the consumer 
goods. 
 
3.  THE LIMITATIONS OF AGRICULTURAL INCOME TAX 
In spite of its theoretical appeal, the imposition of agricultural income tax in 
Pakistan seems neither to be practicable nor justified on any grounds whether 
economic, social or political. This can be seen from the following discussion. 
The rhetoric on agricultural income tax is premised on weak foundation and 
there is no reality in such statements that hold that agriculture pays no tax or that it is 
under-taxed despite the existence of considerable tax potential especially after the 
implementation of the structural adjustment programme raising agricultural 
commodity prices to world levels and ensuring end of implicit taxes in agriculture. 
The fact of the matter is that agriculture in Pakistan is subjected to all kinds of direct, 
indirect and implicit taxes and the practice continues unabated. It is true the 
contribution of direct taxes in agriculture is miniscule, but it is also a fact that it is 
over-burdened with indirect and implicit taxes. And that could be the underlying 
reason of low share of direct taxes.
1 
Taking the tax system as a whole, incidence studies have shown that 
agriculture accounts for the payment of 35-46 percent of total tax revenue in 
Pakistan [Qureshi (1986)]. As agriculture generates only 23 percent of national 
income, the tax burden in agriculture would, at least, be double that of the non-
agricultural sector. But since agriculture supports nearly 70 percent of Pakistan’s 
population, agriculture’s real tax burden in terms of per capita incomes should be 
more than six-times the tax burden in the non-agricultural sector. 
Over and above what, agriculture pays by way of indirect taxes, it is also 
subjected to implicit taxes in the form of low agricultural commodity prices. Basing 
our calculations on comparisons of parity and support prices, Table 1 reports on the 
probable magnitude of implicit taxes from 1995-96 to 1997-98. 
It is clear from Table 1 that support prices of agricultural commodities (with 
the exception of IRRI rice during 1997-98) were at best significantly lower than their 
corresponding  parity prices. As a consequence, implicit taxation of agriculture was  
1In view of the overwhelming emphasis on indirect and implicit taxes in agriculture, the low 
magnitude of direct taxes should not drastically change its burdens relative to those in the non-agricultural 
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Table 1 
Implicit Tax in Pakistan’s Agriculture from 1995-96 to 1997-98 
Commodity Prices (Rs Per Tonne) 
Years and 
Commodities 







  (000 Tonnes) 
(3) 
Total Implicit 
Tax (Rs Million) 
= (1-2)X(3) 
1995-96 
 Wheat  9850  4325  3740  20664   
  Sugarcane  1050  538 45230 23158   
 Basmati  Rice  7775  5550  955  2125   
 IRRI  Rice  3525  2800  1179  855   
 Seed  Cotton  19600  10000  5406  51898 
  
  Total  –   –    –    98700 
1996-97  
 Wheat  9490  6000  3448  11344   
  Sugarcane  1146  600 41998 22931   
  Basmati  Rice  7252  6382 610 531   
 IRRI  Rice  3646  3220  1747  774   
 Seed  Cotton  23570  12500  4782  53893   
  Total  –    –   –   89473 
1997-98  
 Wheat  9774  6000  3984  15036   
  Sugarcane  1089  875 53104 11364   
  Basmati  Rice  8768  7750 736 749   
  IRRI  Rice  3667  3825 2052 –324   
 Seed  Cotton  21955  14375  4689  35543   
  Total  –    –  –  62368 
Source:  [APCom (1997, 1998) and Pakistan (1999)].  
Note:  Parity prices are import parity prices in the case of wheat and sugarcane and export parity prices in 
the case of rice and cotton. Farm-gate parity prices were calculated by adding and subtracting 
transport costs from farm to market respectively from import and export parity prices given in the 
source. Marketed output equals total output of seed cotton and sugarcane and procured and 
exported amounts respectively of wheat and rice. 
 
nearly Rs 99 billion, Rs 90 billion and Rs 63 billion respectively for 1995-96, 1996-97 
and 1997-98. Although the implicit taxes seem to have fallen over this 3 years period, 
most of the decline was the result of falling cotton and sugarcane prices in the 
international market. The implication of this finding is that implicit taxes could rise again 
to 1995-96 levels or beyond with reversal of price trend in the international market. 
 
The above information indicates non-existence of any tax potential in 
agriculture. It is further vitiated by falling profit rates of agriculture in recent  years. 
This situation results from, (1), widespread crop failures and (2),sharper increases of The Theory and Practice of Agricultural Income Tax 
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prices of key agricultural inputs relative to those of major agricultural commodities 
[Chaudhry (1995) and APCom (1997, 1998)] under mounting World Bank/IMF 
pressures for complete removal of subsidies to farm sector. 
The claim that imposition of agricultural income tax would be commensurate 
with automatic additions to tax revenues because of its high income and price 
elasticities, is equally untenable. In fact, there is substantial evidence to the contrary. It 
has long been established that a presumptive income tax whether based on PIUs per 
acre or rental value of land would really amount to no more than a land tax in disguise 
[Bird (1974)]. As land taxes are inherently income and price inelastic, presumptive 
income tax should be similarly classified. According to Wald (1959) “the inelasticity 
which characterises most land taxes is organic, that is to say, it comes from within the 
tax as a result of stable tax rate to a tax base that is not kept current”. Also unlike the 
stable tax yield of a proportional land tax from year to year, the progressive rate 
structure of agricultural income tax that varies directly with farm size or PIUs of an 
agricultural holding can be blamed for declining (in absolute terms) government 
revenues over time because of the operation of inheritance laws and other factors. As 
this is contrary to the very basic tenet of a good tax policy; introduction of agricultural 
income tax can only be a futile and self-defeating exercise. 
The operation of inheritance laws would continue to cause division of 
agricultural holdings to smaller size farms and consequent progressive reduction in 
government revenue. Between 1970 and 1990 the average farm size has already 
fallen from 13.0 to 9.4 acres [Pakistan (1975, 1993)] and is likely to fall further in 
the coming  years. As the recommended agricultural income tax policy also provides 
for tax exemptions below a certain farm size, it may encourage tax evasions through 
 registration of land ownership in the name of  relatives [Newbery (1987)] or even 
through Benami transfers in collusion with revenue officers as under land reforms 
[Herring and Chaudhry (1974)]. While the fall in government revenues is imminent, 
its magnitude would most likely vary directly with steepness of progression, rate of 
subdivision of agricultural holdings, and the tax exemption limit and inversely with 
economies of scale in agriculture. It may also be noted that the agricultural income 
tax would result in narrowing the tax base as against the principle of broadly-based 
tax of a good tax system because the narrower the tax base, the higher the tax rate 
will have to be to generate a given amount of revenue [World Bank (1988)]. 
To the extent that agricultural income tax adds to the temptation of evasion, 
the equity argument is considerably dissipated. The provincial revenue departments 
in some cases have resorted to use crop land as a base for agricultural income tax 
which violates both equity and efficiency principles by progressively alleviating tax 
burdens of larger farms with falling  cultivation intensity as  earlier discussed. 
In comparison to the flat rate land taxes that are easy to manage, the 
progressive rate structure of agricultural income tax makes the system increasingly M. Ghaffar Chaudhry  762 
complex and would be difficult to enforce administratively. A graduated land tax 
policy for effective implementation would require efficient and honest 
administration because the incentive to evade taxes increases with  the introduction 
of progressive tax rates  [Bird and Oldman (1990)]. Under the present situation of 
poor administration, rampant corruption and favouritism, the successful 
implementation of a graduated land tax, like the various land reform attempts, can  
be seriously doubted. Surrey is emphatic on this: “the income tax may well be 
favourite of the twentieth century but it demands twentieth century administration. 
There are many who urge these variants without any comprehension of the complex 
legal and accounting problems which they create” [Surrey (1975)]. Thus the land-
based agricultural income tax policy can hardly be recommended for implementation 
even on administrative grounds. 
 
4.   REFORMING THE AGRICULTURAL TAX SYSTEM 
Although equitable taxation of agriculture is a desirable objective, direct 
progression in the form of either the extension of general income tax or an 
introduction of a graduated land tax, as shown in the foregoing, suffers from 
formidable practical problems of implementation and is unsuited to conditions in 
Pakistan’s agriculture. This being so, progression in agricultural taxation can be 
introduced only indirectly by appropriately combining the proportional land tax and 
a tax on marketed output.
2 This two-tier system of agricultural taxation has all the 
desirable characteristics of a rational tax policy. For example, a proportional land tax 
based on owner’s farm area—cultivated or uncultivated—is preferable over the 
graduated land tax because, as was argued before, it will keep the tax base stable and 
relatively broader, will reduce the temptation for undue subdivision of holdings, will 
avoid the possibility of declining absolute tax revenues over time, will ensure 
efficient use of resources, and above all will be easy to administer. 
A proportional land tax, however is inherently handicapped by its 
inequitableness, and income and price inelasticities. A tax on the marketed produce 
is best suited to overcome these deficiencies of agricultural taxation. In the words of 
Wald, “In certain respects a tax on marketed produce has unique qualifications as an 
instrument of equitable taxation ........  Moreover, the tax is responsive to changes in 
production and prices .....  The incidence of such a tax, as distinguished from that of 
land revenue, will be appropriately heavy on the large land holders. While the small 
land holder, to the extent his crop is consumed and not sold by him will not have to 
bear the tax at all” [Wald (1959)]. In Pakistan the appropriateness of this so-called 
indirect progression, is greatly enhanced as the tenants will not be subjected to 
2The progression is essentially indirect, since the proportional rate on marketed surplus is 
converted into a progressive rate per acre because of relatively higher marketed surplus of the large 
farmers. The Theory and Practice of Agricultural Income Tax 
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heavier tax rates along with the large land holders—the largest producers of 
marketed surplus. The tax base will be widening and the revenue from the tax on 
marketed produce will be expected to grow at the rate of growth of the marketed 
surplus plus the rate of increase in prices of agricultural commodities. In case of crop 
failures and market gluts, tax payments by farmers will automatically be reduced for 
relief against natural calamities. The tax may be implemented through the local 
bodies administration to avoid any additional cost as the local bodies in the recent 
past were collecting a similar tax on agricultural commodities. The tax in addition 
will avoid tax evasion as the farmers will be easily approachable at the market place. 
Moreover, there will be less corruption because the tax collectors will be closely 
supervised. 
To a certain extent a tax on marketed produce may be accompanied by 
deleterious effects on farm and marketed outputs. This can be expected because no 
system of taxation can be perfectly neutral with respect to allocation [World Bank 
(1988)]. It may, however, be noted that the disincentive effect of the policy on 
output and marketed surplus can be considerably reduced by the presence of a heavy 
land tax, especially on unused lands. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to suggest any precise rate structure of the two 
taxes for want of appropriate statistics. It would, to a large degree, depend on revenue 
demand of the government from the sector. However, the system could be considerably 
simplified if half the revenue demand from agriculture is met through a land tax and the 
other half through a tax on marketed output. As agriculture is already over taxed in the 
form of indirect and implicit taxes, it is an absolute necessity to discontinue 
indiscriminate use of fiscal and price policies for massive transfer of resources from 
agriculture to non-agricultural sector. This, in precise terms, could only be done by 
ensuring effective transmittal of world prices to agriculture in Pakistan through 
establishment of regulated private marketing system with  close supervision by the 
government to guard against malfunctioning. In view of the volatile nature of world 
prices, fixation of domestic agricultural commodity prices may be undertaken on the 
basis of five-year moving average of world prices. The price policy thus evolved would 
have built-in stability of prices and consistency with zero support to agriculture as taxes 
in years of high world prices would be automatically canceled out by positive transfers 
into agriculture during  years of low world prices. 
 
5.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As discussed in the foregoing, agriculture is subjected to direct, indirect and 
implicit taxes. Its contribution therefore to total tax revenues must be based on the 
incidence analysis of all three which would reveal the huge and oppressive burden of 
taxes on agriculture. 
While increasing dependence on direct taxes would be highly desirable, 
progression in agricultural taxation cannot be introduced by the introduction of a 
general  income  tax or  a  graduated  land  tax  due  to   many  practical  problems  of  a  M. Ghaffar Chaudhry  764 
 
fundamental nature. If equitable taxation of agriculture is at all desirable, progression in 
land taxes has to be achieved in an indirect way. For this purpose, a two-tier system of 
agricultural taxation, involving a proportional land tax on the pattern of land revenue 
and a uniform tax on marketed surplus can be recommended. Devised in a proper 
manner, the two-tier system would be equitable, responsive to changes in income and 
inflation and easy to implement, manage and operate even with the present   
administrative set-up. A uniform rate structure of a tax on marketed output may prove 
to be progressive in its impact, if the tax is ultimately paid by the farm sector and if the 
marketed surplus varies directly with farm size. There can be little doubt that the two 
relationships would largely hold as far as Pakistan’s agriculture is concerned. 
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Comments 
 
Tax on agricultural incomes has been the subject of substantial controversy in 
the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent. During the Mughal period, landlords as agents of 
kings collected land revenue as land rent on the basis of per acre production [Habib 
(1982), 235–240]. During the British period the fixed land rent was the major source 
of government revenue [Kumar and Desai (1982), p. 928]. This source of revenue 
fell with the weakening of British power in the sub-continent from 53 percent of total 
taxes in 1900-01 to 7 percent in 1946-47. The revenue collected during the Mughal 
and the British administrations was not a tax on agricultural incomes as 
conventionally understood, but a graduated surcharge on land revenue with a high 
exemption limit and low rates [Qureshi (1987), p. 159]. 
We can assess Mr Ghaffar’s paper from five angles: (a) desirability; (b) 
revenue productivity; (c) taxpayers compliance; (d) tax administration; and (e) 
equity, social justice, fairness, income distribution. We will discuss these briefly. 
In the last fifty years a number of expert committees and studies have 
examined the possibility of introducing a direct tax on farm incomes. These studies 
have covered almost the whole field of agricultural taxation, including the feasibility 
of extending the general income tax law to agricultural incomes. Most of the studies 
undertaken during the 1960s and the 1970s maintained that the agriculture sector was 
already under heavy implicit and explicit taxes through hidden transfers, and 
therefore it was not capable of bearing the burden of additional taxation [Hornby 
(1968), p. 105; Dixit (1971), p. 385; Azher (1973), p. 83; Newbery (1974), p. 38; 
Newbery (1987), pp. 367–370; Qureshi (1987), p. 159; NCA (1988), p. 529]. These 
studies concluded that extending income tax laws to agricultural income would not 
be a productive source of additional revenue for the government [Joshi et al. (1968), 
p. 329; Ahmad and Stern (1991), p. 253] and if a tax was imposed its yield would be 
negligible and its effect would be harmful to the sector’s productive capacity [LUMS 
(1986), p. 63; NCA (1988), p. 536]. 
Studies undertaken in the 1980s pointed out that although the vast majority of 
people engaged in agriculture were living below the subsistence level, a number of 
them enjoyed large incomes. Since their income is exempt from tax these landlords 
live luxurious lives and have made substantial investments in city real estate, 
creating a situation of antagonism among the trading and industrial classes as well as 
the professional class who are forced to pay income tax. This antagonism has 
discouraged tax compliance and provided strong incentives for tax evasion among 
business and professional income tax payers [Hamid (1970), p. 438; NTRC (1986), 
p. 134; NCA (1988), p. 530; Coopers and Lybrand (1989), pp. 3–8]. 
Assessment of the agricultural tax potential by the government, researchers and 
international financial institutions varies considerably from Rs 2.0 billion to Rs 60 billion. 
This assessment is based on various methods, such as extension of existing income tax Comments  767
laws [NTRC (1986), p. 160; Mohammad (1987), pp. 424–425] or land tax levied on 
potential yields with a simple rate structure [Qureshi (1987), p. 12; NCA (1988), p. 537; 
Ahmad and Stern (1991), pp. 255–259], PIU’s, presumptive tax on agriculture. Some 
research studies argued that the revenues from agricultural income tax would be so low 
that it would not meet even the cost of tax collection. It is also argued that it would be 
very difficult to administer the tax because farmers do not keep accounts. 
These no-arguments confuse the basic issue. At the conceptual level, it 
needs to be underscored that the individuals and not the sectors pay income taxes. 
Therefore, an individual earning incomes above a certain level is obliged to pay 
income taxes irrespective of the fact whether a person earns income from 
agriculture, manufacturing or any other activity. There is no rationale for treating 
incomes earned from different sources differently for income tax purposes. Since 
the distribution of land is highly skewed, agricultural incomes are also distributed 
very unevenly, and the imposition of income tax on agriculture would lead to a 
fairer distribution of incomes and wealth in rural Pakistan. At a conceptual level, 
therefore there is hardly any room for disagreement over the desirability of 
imposing agricultural income tax. 
One may not dispute that because of government design domestic prices of 
most of the agricultural goods have all along remained below world market prices by 
a wide margin. It has been rightly pointed out in the paper that depressed prices 
amount to an implicit taxation of agricultural commodities. This has caused resource 
transfer from the agriculture sector resulting in lower incomes of the farmers than the 
income they would have earned if the international market prices of the output had 
prevailed. Yet it is no argument for retaining the present system of tax exemptions to 
agricultural incomes because implicit taxation affects the rich and the poor equally, 
while the highest impact of a progressive tax on agricultural income, imposed 
properly, would be on rich farmers. The majority of the small farmers will be exempt 
from the tax. The equity and fairness considerations demand the imposition of 
income tax on all the groups irrespective of the yield and cost. 
The argument that a tax on agricultural income would pose considerable 
problem of compliance and administrative inconvenience to tax agencies should not 
be taken as an excuse. A handful of studies suggest that initially big landowners be 
brought into the tax net and once the system is in place, the tax net can be enlarged. 
The proposed structure of two taxes—a land tax and a tax on marketed 
output—was discussed in detail in the past [Task Force Report (1996)]. The system, 
however, was not supported because of complications. 
One must be careful in arguing the influence of external agencies on the 
imposition of agricultural income tax. A number of Tax Reform Committees/ 
Commissions have supported the proposal of a tax on agricultural incomes. Since the 
early 1980s the ongoing structural adjustment programmes and the economic and 
political developments in the country have given rise to a renewed interest in favour 
of imposition of tax on agricultural incomes. Muhammad Aslam Khan  768
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